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Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 26, 2009 2:51 PM
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Then it was given to Adm. Kimmel, who was relieved of
command after the the Pearl Harbor disaster. Then Nimitz
took the spot. It seems odd that he would turn down something every naval officer would work for his entire life to get.
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 26, 2009 3:58 PM
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Nimitz was head of the Bureau of Navigation at the time. I hadn't heard before that he was offered command of CINCPAC before Pearl Harbor. What source does this come from?
I think at the time the position was called CINCUS (Commander in Chief, U.S.), but was changed to CINCPAC later due to the unfortunate way the acrinym sounded.
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 26, 2009 4:12 PM
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Nimitz had not finished his job at the bureau of Nav and so it was decided not to take him out of the position. He wasnt offered the job but under consideration. He would haven ever made the job later if he had turned it down.
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 26, 2009 4:15 PM
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It is true. Nimitz was offered both positions first. It have meant jumping over 50+ (as I recall) senior admirals. Since the Bureau of Navigation was considered the peach job on the path to CNO (he had control of all officer personnel assignments) and he did not wish to aggravate that many of his fellow flag officers, he declined the offer. Kimmel jumped about 33 when he accepted the offer. Note that the implacable King was one of those jumped.
After the war, Nimitz is said to have said that he realized that if anything happened it would be career-ending, which has been taken by revisionists to mean he had some foreknowledge of an attack., but certainly Kimmel would have had the same reservations about the jobs. He probably accepted the job primarily because of his close friendship with Stark from their Academy days-Stark had mentored Kimmel. Afterwards, Stark turned his back on Kimmel in the effort to cover his own rear end.
Tom
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 26, 2009 6:12 PM
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many of the admirals passed over were not eligible for the job because they were too close to retirement. It is not uncommon for position jumping, Marshall did the same.
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 26, 2009 7:36 PM
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If you don’t mind, could you provide a source for Nimitz turning down the CinCPac job?
I only ask as I have been re-reading my copy of Dr. E.B. Potter’s definitive biography “Nimitz,” NIP, 1976. I see where Nimitz, as a captain, transfers from USS Augusta to a new assignment as Assistant Chief, BuNav in the spring of 1935. In the spring of 1938 he’s promoted to rear admiral and by he in a new billet as ComCruDiv2. Didn’t work out though, he was stricken with a hernia and he was hospitalized and medically relieved of duty. All’s well that ends well; when released by the medicos for active service he is assigned as ComBatDiv1, an even better command. In January 1939 while the majority of the USN is involved in Fleet Exercise XX in the Caribbean, Nimitz remains in the Pacific as SOPA with the collateral duty of ComTF7 (remember, this was in the days when CinCPac was also CinCUS and as such attended fleet exercises) In the spring he is again transferred, this time as Chief, BuNav and by June 1939 he is back in Washington. It fell to Nimitz to oversee the beginnings of the greatest expansion the USN had ever experienced, both in naval and civilian personnel.
In all Potter’s recounting of Nimitz’ tenure as BuNav, there is absolutely no mention, not a hint, not one word, that could possibly be construed to mean that he was offered CinCPac over Kimmel in the end of 1940/beginning of 1941. Nothing.
Potter was well acquainted with his subject, they had collaborated in “Sea Power: A Naval History,” they were personal friends, and he was personally asked by Mrs. Nimitz to write the biography Nimitz himself would not allow while he was alive.
So, who is your source?
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 26, 2009 8:14 PM
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The commander before Kimmel, took over in Feb 1941, was
Adm James Richardson. He was fired by FDR, after objecting - twice in person- to FDR, about the Fleet being at Pearl Harbor. Richardson didn't feel our fleet was ready for war with Japan and that Pearl was not defended well
enough. I know every commander wants more resources,
but Richardson was right about this. He retired in 1942,
right in the middle of a war. This seems unsual to me for a
military man. In his memoirs, he was very critical, of both
FDR and Adm Stark.
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 27, 2009 4:16 PM
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Stark had a hand in the failures at Pearl and was quietly relieved from his job. richardson mistake in his criticism was forgetting that he had his orders and was obligated to follow them, with out complaint. It is a fact of our system that admirals and generals cannt alway get the orders they want, much as teh common soldier or sailor doesnt always like theri orders. Fdr's decision was as much a political one as a military.
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 27, 2009 4:29 PM
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Forgive me, but I find a half-liner, un-sourced itself, in a not particularly accurate internet squib to be somewhat unconvincing as opposed to Dr. Potter’s biography.
It is also interesting to note that in Gordon Prange’s “At Dawn We Slept” (1981) on page 63 appears the following:
“By all normal procedures Richardson should have remained ad CinCUS at least another full year. In fact, before he left Washington in October, Stark and Rear Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, chief of the Bureau of Navigation (BuNav), which at the time handled personnel mattes, informed him that they believed he would remain in command until he had completed his two years’ service in that post. (34)“
(34) PHA. US Cong., Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27 and 49, 79th Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (15 Nov. 1945–20 Feb. 1946), 39 parts in 32 vols., Part I, 322-323
Have you read a Nimitz biography, you know, like in a book, by a real historian, as opposed to the internet? Unless you’re using it to download actual documents, the internet, and especially superficially sourced internet articles, is a really bad place to do one’s research.
And not to go off on a tangent, I note a couple of gaps in your post regarding Richardson.
You should be a little more aware of exactly what Richardson complained. In his endorsement to the Martin-Bellinger readiness report (have you read that little gem?) to Admiral Stark, then CNO, dated 8 January1941, Richardson agreed with the need for additional and improved AAA defense and an increase in the number of AAF pursuit squadrons. But he also, apparently as a hedge, wrote:
“As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or antiaircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of fighter squadron were required." [Emphasis mine]
And his next paragraph:
“There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.” [again, my emphasis]
So, yes, he thought Pearl Harbor defenses were in need of improvement, but, apparently he did not believe Oahu was in any particular danger of being attacked, especially by carriers. As did Kimmel, he, at least in my mind, was focusing on what the Japanese might do as opposed to what they could do.
Richardson’s primary complaint with Pearl Harbor was not a lack of defenses, but, rather a lack of facilities. In this he was not far wrong. During his tenure Pearl Harbor was but a glorified advanced base. All the nearest important and critical facilities were in the areas of San Diego, San Francisco and Seattle. In the event of a declaration of war, in order to even think about initiating war plan Orange, a goodly portion of the Pacific Fleet would have to leave Oahu and return to the west coast for outfitting and supplies. His complaint was the inefficiency of it all. And indeed, until the expansion of the Pearl Harbor base was far along replenishment could be a problem. Even up to the end of the war, major battle damage repair or overhaul and maintenance of capital ships required their return to the west coast.
From Johnson, William Bruce “The Pacific Campaign of World War II” London 2006, pages 18, 19, 20 & 21:
“In the spring of 1940, worried about a Japanese attack on the oil-rich East Indies, FDR ordered Adm. Richardson to station the Fleet in Hawaii, citing its “deterrent effect” on Japan.(111) Richardson was among those who vociferously disagreed with this deployment, telling Navy secretary Frank Knox and the Navy’s chief of operations, Adm. Harold R. “Betty” Stark, that since these warships could not fight Japan without first returning to the west coast for refitting, provisioning, and staffing up, retaining them in Hawaii constituted a hollow threat.(112)”
- o o o -
“Richardson, testifying in 1945 at a congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor, recounted having lunch on 8 October 1940 with Roosevelt and with Adm. William Leahy. At the lunch FDR reiterated the deterrence value of retaining the Fleet in Hawaii. He had made a political rather than a military judgment, the Hawaiian deployment being the brainchild of no naval theorist but of ex-State Department political expert Stanley Hornbeck.(115) Richardson countered that since Japan’s military undoubtedly knew that the US’s ships were not war-ready, deterrence would best be served by returning the ships to the Mainland for outfitting and staffing. Leahy, also testifying at the 1945 hearings, said that at the lunch he had been shocked to hear Richardson declare the US Fleet unprepared for war. While Leahy did not specifically recall Roosevelt asserting that a Hawaiian-based Fleet had deterrence value, he remembered that as a common opinion in Washington in 1940, although he – like Richardson and other experienced navalists – disagreed with it.
- o o o -
“By Richardson’s telling, Roosevelt in the course of the October 1940 luncheon remarked that if Japan attacked the Netherlands East Indies, or the independent, theoretically neutral Thailand, or the British possessions of Burma, the Malay States and Singapore, or even the Philippines, the US would not declare war.(120) FDR added, however, that “sooner or later” Japan “would make a mistake,” thus rendering US intervention in a Pacific war inevitable.(121) Leahy in his congressional testimony recalled no such comments from Roosevelt, adding that since the Philippines was still a US possession, of course FDR would have declared war if it had been attacked.(122)
- o o o -
“In the months and years following the luncheon, Leahy’s career continued its upward trajectory. He would become chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff while at the same time serving as Roosevelt’s own chief-of-staff and closest military advisor, being promoted in December 1944 to the five-star rank of Fleet Admiral. Richardson’s career, meanwhile, cratered. In a memoir written in 1958 but not published until 1973, he admitted holding back from his testimony in 1945 a frank admonishment he delivered to FDR during the luncheon:
‘I feel that I must tell you that the senior officers of the Navy do not have the trust and confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific.’(126)
“Admitting in a memoir that one gave less than the whole truth under oath in a congressional hearing on a matter of crucial national importance tends to undercut the credibility both of the original testimony and of the new, unsworn addendum. Since Richardson did not include this alleged part of the luncheon conversation in his sworn testimony, Leahy was not asked to affirm or deny that it was said. Nevertheless, there is good circumstantial evidence that Richardson did say this to Roosevelt: several months after the lunch, Richardson was relieved of command. When he asked Navy secretary Frank Knox why he was fired, Knox said the president would be calling him to discuss it. That call never came. But Knox did provide at least a hint: “The last time you were here you hurt the President’s feelings.” This was an oddly personal, sentimental way to express what Richardson should have already known, that his comment to his commander-in-chief that day had been not just inappropriate but grossly insubordinate.
“At a minimum, Richardson had pressed too hard his case for a battleready, Mainland-based Navy, and in doing so destroyed whatever chance a subtler, consensus-building approach might have had to convince Roosevelt to retransfer the Fleet from Hawaii to west coast ports.(127) Thereafter excluded from power, Richardson at least had the consolation of being a prophet, a whistle-blower, and a martyr.”
Expanded footnotes for same:
(111) Pogue, Forrest. “George C. Marshall” New York 1966, 168; PHR. US Cong., Sen., Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Investigation of the Pear Harbor Attack, Report . . . Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Cong., Sen. Doc. 244, 79th Cong. 2nd Sess. 20 July 1946, 159–60; Morgenstern, George. “Pearl Harbor” New York 1947, ch. 5.
(112) PHA. US Cong., Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27 and 49, 79th Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. (15 Nov. 1945–20 Feb. 1946), 39 parts in 32 vols., 1:253, 263–64, 275–76, 286; Burlingame, Burl. “Advance Force Pearl Harbor” 1992; Annapolis 2002, 30–31; Woodward, Llewellyn, Sir. “British Foreign Policy in the Second World War” 5 vols, London 1970–76, 2:109–14, 127. A book-length study of US capability in the Pacific, published in 1941, concluded that the Fleet is ready to “concede the military initiative to Japan in the western Pacific” because it “could reasonably expect to overcome in a short time any initial advantage gained by Japan.” Puleston, W.D. “The Armed Forces of the Pacific” New Haven, CT 1941, 26–27.
(115) Seow Hwye Min, “The Attack on Pearl Harbor – The Lessons for Today’s Strategic Thinkers.” Pointer: J. Singapore Armed Forces 24/3 (July–Sept. 1998); Marks, Frederick. “Wind Over Sand” Athens, GA 1988, 49; Conroy, Hilary and Wray, Harry, eds. “Pearl Harbor Reexamined” Honolulu 1990, 28; Morgenstern 57, 60–61; Sutherland Denlinger and Charles Gary, “War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems” New York 1936, 277; Pratt, Fletcher. “Sea Power and Today’s War” New York 1939, 205.
(120 )The speculations within the Japanese military of possible US reactions are outlined in Morley, James, ed. “Japan’s Road to the Pacific War” New York 1980–94. Selections from Taiheiyo¯ senso¯ e no michi: kaisen no gaiko¯ shi [Tokyo 1962–63]. Vol. 5: “The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941” Trans. David Titus. 1994, 5:106.
(121) PHA 1:265–66; Beard 416–17; Burlingame, 37. See also the discussion of Lt.-Cmdr. Arthur McCollum’s 7 October 1940 memo in Stinnett, Robert B. “Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor” New York 2000, 7–9, 262–65; Miller, Edward. “War Plan Orange” Annapolis, MD 1991, 264.
(122) PHA 1:341–43, 351–57 (testimony of Leahy); Brownlow, Donald. “The Accused” New York 1968, 67–68.
(126) James, D. Clayton. “A Time for Giants: Politics of the American High Command in World War II” New York 1987, 47–48; E. Miller, 326; Richardson, James O. “On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor” Washington, DC 197, 3 424–36; Beach, Edward L. “Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor” Annapolis, MD 1995, 62; Morison, Samuel Eliot. “History of United States Naval Operations in World War II” Boston, MA 1947– 62, 15 vols., 3:46–47; Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York 1981, 39.
(127) Prange, 47; Beach, 13; Kimmel, Husband E. “Admiral Kimmel’s Story” Chicago, IL 1955, 7; Brownlow 75.
Continuing - - -
As far as Richardson’s retirement in 1942, you may wish to acquaint yourself with the personnel policies of the day. Born in 1878, Richardson would have met the statutory retirement date at the end of fiscal 1943. He had been serving on the General Board since leaving the CinCPac/CinCUS job in his permanent grade (yes, all flag and general officers in three and four star jobs were actually only of temporary rank, their permanent rank was two stars) of rear admiral. He was advanced upon retirement, and since that takes congressional approval under the 1926 Dismukes Law, I presume he either applied for or the administration so requested, to his highest rank achieved, Admiral.
Not sure how much you know about flag/general officer retirement processes. In the normal course of events a general or admiral would receive an informal and non-official letter from a deputy personnel chief of equal or higher rank. This letter would inform the individual that there his relief in his current position could be expected on or about a certain date. It would go on to say that there was no further reassignment envisioned. This is what is called a subtle “it is time to request retirement” hint and the officer concerned, in 99.44% of the cases, gets the message.
Richardson’s retirement in 1942 was, from what I have read was strictly routine, he reached the retirement age and there were, apparently no assignments envisioned which would have allowed an exemption. Assignment to the General Board, in the interwar Navy was a piece of the message, to the effect, “we don’t anticipate an active command in your future so you stay on this board until you retire on your own or you reach statutory retirement age.” Were there exemptions? Of course there were. E J King, for example, stayed on beyond mandatory retirement, so did WD Leahy, but only after he had come back to active duty following first retirement in 1939 (at the statutory age of 65).
Perhaps a closer acquaintance with the personnel policies might shed a more light on such retirement mysteries. Also goes along way towards explaining how things eventually worked out for Kimmel and Short in their retirements.
Regards,
Rich
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 27, 2009 8:12 PM
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Tom -
Thank you. I stand corrected on that point. I was looking more in the vicinity of pages 169-171 which discusses his time as BuNav.
I also see Potter's last comment on the the subject, "There is not, however, any indication that Admiral Nimitz in declining the command of the U. S. Fleet had any motive beyond the one he professed, lack of seniority."
Thanks for pointing out these pages.
Regards,
Rich
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 28, 2009 9:33 AM
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This is what Chester Nimitz Jr said, in a History Channel
interview, in 1996, with Adm. Chester Nimitz son,
Chester Nimitz Jr. In this interview, Nimitz Jr said:
My father told me, "It is my guess that the Japanese are going to attack us in a surprise attack, there will be a revulsion in the country against all those in command at sea and ah, they will be replaced by people in positions of prominence at shore and I wanna be at shore and not at sea when that happens".
How Nimitz figured this out, before it happened, is my question. I really don't think Potter is addressing this question.
And please don't tell me this is not true. Watch the video
http://ahivfree.alexanderstreet.com/View/500092. On this
web site there is also a printed text, of the narrative.
I really think people like Adm. Nimitz, choose not to play the
blame game after PH, I can see why they wouldn't. There had been several seperate investigations, into the
debacle. The war was over and FDR, a national hero was
dead. Naval and really all warfare had totally changed and
nothing more, was really going to be accomplished, with all the hearings and investigations.
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 28, 2009 11:21 AM
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Ahh, so we arrive at the crux of your thread posting - - - Let us cut to the chase and that way you won't have to further mince your words.
And frankly your style of posing your initial question led me to suspect this is where you were going.
Are you accusing Nimitz of being a member of the Grand Pearl Harbor Cabal?
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Re: Why Adm. Nimitz turned down CINCPAC position in Feb, 1941
Oct 28, 2009 2:43 PM
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There just seemed to be some people that got it, and others that
didn't. I don't know why this seems to be the case. My understanding is that there is still classified material, for this period.
Being so long ago, I just don't see the harm in releasing it. So,
there is still something, our government does not want the world
to know.
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