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Chattanooga, Part 18 – Chickamauga Sept. 19 – Viniard Farm (Part B)
Nov 4, 2009 6:24 PM
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Chattanooga, Part 18 – Chickamauga Sept. 19 – Viniard Farm (Part B)
In response to pleas for assistance coming from the East Viniard Field area, Bragg asked Buckner to assist. Having previously dispatched Stevensen’s division to Brock Field to the north, Buchner had left only Preston’s division, consisting of three brigades, which he threw into the action. As they worked their way westward, they came in to the south of the fighting at East Viniard Field, with Trigg’s brigade on their right, which stumbled upon the south-east corner of the East Viniard Field. Trigg paused to ask for directions as to where his troops should be placed, but his messengers could find no one in command to ask. So he moved his men forward, with the 1st Florida Cavalry (dismounted) as skirmishers to his front.
The Florida men entered the field just as Carlin’s men were falling back, being pressed by Robertson’s Texans. Into this fray came Wilder’s brigade, which had been held in reserve across the LaFayette Road in the West Viniard Field. Their Spencer Rifles provided overwhelming firepower which saved a Union battery from being captured and pushed the Floridians back into the tree line (along with Robertson’s men).
Wilder had now re-established a line in the field, mostly facing the east tree line with his left flank refused as protection against the Texans in the tree line on the north edge of the field. At that point Barne’s brigade, which was supposed to have proceeded further north to plug the gap between Davis’ and Thomas’ forces, arrived on the scene. They had waited, undetected in an overgrown field just south of the East Viniard Field, while couriers searched for a commander to give them orders. Finding none, Barnes decided that by proceeding northward into the East Viniard Field he would be on the flank of the Confederates, so he gave the order to advance in a north-easterly direction. Wilder withdrew his units, in answer to another call for help.
In the meantime, Union Col. Mendenhall was massing Union artillery in the S.W. corner of the East Viniard Field. But Barne’s advance cut across the path of the artillery as it advanced across the field, forcing them to suspend their fire temporarily. It also came across the front of Carlin’s divisions, masking their fire from right to left as it progressed forward, forcing them to cease firing. Right at that point, Trigg’s brigade climbed over the fence on the eastern edge of the field and charged – right into the flank of Barne’s brigade. The results were predictable, as units became unglued and Barne’s regiments became so intertwined with Carlin’s regiments that command and control was lost. Trigg’s advance was halted only when the massed Union batteries in the corner of the field were free to resume fire, checking Trigg’s advance.
At this point Wood’s division arrived, marching northward on the LaFayette Road. Rosecran’s original intent had been for Wood’s division to plug the gap between Van Clive’s division to the north around the Brock’s field action and Davis’ left in the Viniard Field vicinity. But there was confusion over whether Woods should be directed to support Barnes in the south of East Viniard Field, Heg in the forest north of East Viniard Field, or even further north between Heg and Van Clive. Davis and Wood ultimately assigned Harker’s Brigade of Wood’s division to go into action supporting Heg at the log schoolhouse, but just then a courier arrived reporting that Confederates had gained the LaFayette Road to the north, and Heg quickly changed his axis of attack to the north, where he found no Confederates on the road, but disorganized units from both sides fighting desperate but uncoordinated actions in the woods to the east of the road.
There had been a crisis there, but it had been resolved even before Harker had been informed of it. At 3:30 p.m. McNair’s 39th N.C. and 25th Arkansas found Heg’s left flank, pushed back the remnants of the 35th Ill., and surged across the LaFayette road into the open fields around Brock’s House and Farm (which lay west of the LaFayette Road, and north of the Viniard Farm). They appeared to be on the flank and rear of the Union army, only eight hundred yards from Rosecrans’ headquarters at the Widow Glen’s house. But just then Wilder’s brigade let lose from the tree line on their left, and the withering fire from Wilder's repeating rifles disintegrated the 25th Arkansas, compelling both Confederate regiments to withdraw back across the field. Again Wilder, acting as a mobile reserve, had saved the Union line.
In the meantime, Col. George Buell, in charge of one of Wood’s brigades, had been left on the LaFayette Road. Lacking any other instructions, he formed his brigade in two lines parallel to the road, facing east. The news he got from various officers passing back and forth was that the Confederates were being driven back, and Buell would be called upon to turn their retreat into a rout.
Back in the E. Viniard Field, Trigg’s forces were driving the 99th Ohio and the 35th Indiana under Col. Swain back west across the field. The Confederates saw their chance to capture the batteries of the 2nd Minn. Light Artillary and the 3rd. Wisc. Light Artillary, on a rise to their front, and charged the batteries, three hundred yards away. The remnants of the 101st Ohio was trying to defend the batteries, but when a few rounds were accidentally fired into the back of those friendly forces, those supporting troops understandably disappeared. But the noise of battle made it impossible for Trigg’s commands to be heard, and Trigg and the 6th Florida found themselves charging alone, 200 yards in advance of friendly forces, with the 81st Indiana pouring fire into it’s flank. Trigg ordered the 6th Florida to halt and wait for the rest of the brigade, stopping only a hundred yards from their target. What Trigg didn’t know was that Robertson had intercepted the rest of Trigg’s brigade and was re-directing their axis of attack away from the batteries, and towards the north-west. Finding himself alone with only one regiment, Trigg was forced to abandon his goal of seizing the batteries, and march off to join the rest of his brigade.
Robertson was now sweeping the remaining Union troops in front of him. Heg’s brigade, exhausted by two hours of continuous fighting in the forest, buckled and then gave way. Heg’s men came running for the relative safety of the ditch behind the Viniard farm. Buell’s first rank (two regiments) lay down as Heg’s men fled the field, then rose on command to deliver a volley as soon as the Confederates broke through the tree line. But just then an officer rode up, begging them not to fire, as “two lines of our own troops are still in the woods”. There was confusion for a moment, then a wave of bullets struck Buell’s first line, cutting down every officer still on horseback. A rebel yell pierced the air, and Buell’s first line of regiments were swallowed up in a wave of butternut. There was a wild melee of hand-to-hand combat, until the remnants retreated back to a fence line and managed to deliver a volley which slowed the Texan’s advance, but they were soon forced to run again to join Heg’s refugees in the ditch further back. Buell’s second line advanced forward with fixed bayonets, but the experienced Texans quickly found their flank and they, also, were forced to join their comrades in the ditch.
The 58th Indiana suffered an even greater injustice. Just as it entered the farmyard, it was hit hard – not by Confederates, but by the horses and caissons of Estep’s battery, which was running from the field. The terrified horses couldn’t be controlled, running over the ranks of the Union troops, crushing quite a few under their hoofs and wheels, and forcing companies to veer aside to avoid a similar result. In the confusion which followed, the regiment completely broke up, swallowed up by the smoke, rifle fire, and retreating Union forces which tended to carry everything they met along with them.
It is debated about what affect Buell’s men had on the Confederate attack. Buell claimed that they slowed the Confederates for a quarter-hour of bitter fighting. Robertson’s Texans said merely that the Yankees ran to the safety of a fence, delivered a scattered volley, and then ran again. But Buell’s meager resistance did provide the impetus for Robertson to abscond with most of Trigg’s brigade, allowing the Union batteries to successfully withdraw from the East Viniard Field.
In the meantime, the shallow ditch west of the Viniard Farm now contained the remnants of the better part of three Union brigades, and was quickly becoming a killing zone. The Union troops, living, wounded, and dead were so crowded together that they couldn’t reload their weapons and return fire. Their retreat was impeded by a high worm fence just west of the ditch, which couldn’t be scaled without drawing a swarm of Confederate bullets. Regardless, the Union troops in the ditch soon realized that their odds in the open weren’t much worse than they were if they remained in the ditch, and either as individuals or as groups they made a run for the breastworks at the tree-line which Wilder’s brigade had constructed earlier that day, and was again manned by Wilder’s brigade, freshly back “home” from cutting off the Confederate advance to the north.
A few Confederates tried to pursue the running federals, but once the last Union troops either made it to the safety of the barricades or died in the process, Wilder’s brigade had an open field of fire and used it to great affect. Lilly’s battery joined with double canister from the northwest corner of the field, and the pursuing Confederates were shredded, bringing an abrupt halt to the advance. Wilder’s Brigade had saved Rosecran’s army for the third time in a single day, but it’s difficult to say how much further Gregg’s and Robertson’s exhausted brigades could have continued the pursuit. Robertson realized this, and he also realized the ditch could become just as much of a killing zone for his troops as it did for the federals. He withdrew his units back across the road, taking advantage of the rise just east of the LaFayette Road to form a new line.
Once Buell, Carlin, and Heg re-assembled what was left of their commands, they perceived Robertson’s withdrawal as a defeat, and Buell decided to pursue, with Heg and Carlin on his left and right flank respectively. It was bout 4:30 p.m. The combat disintegrated into a brawl, with charges and counter-charges, with no attempt at flanking or any other sophisticated tactics. One of Wilder’s men said that Union regiments would arrive on the field from their right, enter the forest, and then run back, followed by Confederates charging with bayonets leveled until fire from Wilder’s brigade forced them back again. Then the entire process would be repeated again and again.
On the Confederate side, Benning’s brigade arrived and it took over the position previously held by Robertson, who moved to his left and positioned his brigade entirely in the East Viniard Field. As the combat continued, Heg’s and Carlin’s brigades disintegrated with each volley. The 15th Wisconsin had only 176 men at the start of the battle, it now numbered only 65. The 8th Kansas was at half the strength it had at the start of the day, and the 25th Ill. had lost two-thirds of it’s number. Among those felled in this late-afternoon combat was Heg, who was shot through the bowels and insisted on remaining on his horse while he tried to rally his men, although he died shortly thereafter. Carlin’s brigade hadn’t suffered quite so badly, although Company A of the 101st Ohio now consisted of a lieutenant and four men.
Soon, no Union soldiers were on the east side of the LaFayette Road in the vicinity of the Viniard House, but Wilder’s Spencers and the canister from Lilly’s battery had kept most of them from crossing the Viniard farmyard on the west side of the road. Benning’s brigade tried it, but were soon driven into the same ditch which Buell’s men had vainly attempted to use as shelter earlier. What the Confederates desperately needed was artillery to quiet Lilly’s batteries, but they had none available. When Benning refused to withdraw, waiting for help which would never come, Lilly ran some guns out to a point where they could shoot canister perpendicular to the ditch, causing fearsome losses. As the sun began to set, Benning’s men abandoned the ditch and ran back across the LaFayette Road.
Both sides were pretty fought out at that point, and the sun was falling behind the trees. Any new offensive action in this portion of the battlefield would have to be conducted by fresh troops.
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Re: Chattanooga, Part 18 – Chickamauga Sept. 19 – Viniard Farm (Part B)
Nov 8, 2009 5:53 AM
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Wilder’s Spencers and the canister from Lilly’s battery
This was the early warning sign that the massed assault was finished as a viable tactic on the battlefield. Unfortunately the lesson was not quite driven home until the massive slaughter of the World War I killing fields. Late in that war the design of battle was forever changed by the appearance of the first tanks. These totally unreliable devices led the way for the internal combustion engine to take over the battlefield. The developement of more powerful lighter weight power plants added mobility, speed, flight, and the abilty to protect soldiers with armor to the fight. Adherents to this change would rule the day in the next great conflict.
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Re: Chattanooga, Part 18 – Chickamauga Sept. 19 – Viniard Farm (Part B)
Nov 8, 2009 4:46 PM
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Part of the problem during the first day at Chickamauga was that so much of the conflict took place in the depths of the forest with thick underbrush between companies, regiments, and brigades. Few divisional leaders actually saw the results of the carnage - in fact, regimental leaders could seldom see both ends of his own line. This lead to units being left in far too long exchanging volleys at short range in an exercise of deadly futility.
I suspect that if the combat took place in open fields like that more often experienced in northern Virginia, division, army and corps commanders would not have let the units stay in that position for such a long period of time. Commanders would have either pushed more units in at selected points in order to prevail, or more effectively tried flanking maneuvers, or withdrawn in the face of superior forces.
As for the performance of Wilder's brigade and his repeating Spencers, it does seem that this had a much more significant effect on combat tactics than the advent of the rifled musket. Not only did the Spencers give Wilder's brigade considerable increased firepower, but it also changed combat tactics - the ability to lie prone or crouched under cover while firing - and loading - made them much less vulnerable to return fire.
Also, Wilder wasn't allowing his men to get stuck in a long exchange of volleys. He quickly got them to the point where they were needed, achieved the immediate objective, and then as soon as other Union troops were available, he withdrew his own brigade. This shows he appreciated that his brigade provided a valuable resource not to be wasted in a slugfest which wouldn't affect the outcome of the battle.
One thing I haven't noticed yet is a reference to how Wilder's brigade was able to replenish their ammunition. Lots of units on both sides were having ammunition shortages even while firing muzzle-loading rifled muskets at a rate of two or three rounds a minute. But Wilder's brigade managed to go from one spot to another, deliver considerable firepower, without reporting a shortage of cartridges.
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Re: Chattanooga, Part 18 – Chickamauga Sept. 19 – Viniard Farm (Part B)
Nov 8, 2009 7:08 PM
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One thing I haven't noticed yet is a reference to how Wilder's brigade was able to replenish their ammunition
A very interesting thought! I think from my dealings with this brigade that there must have been some unmentioned resupply system. Although with a seven shot magazine in the weapon a three shot barrage fired in a short period of time must have felt that they should have depeleted their ammunition, but that was not the case.
dan
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Re: Chattanooga, Part 18 – Chickamauga Sept. 19 – Viniard Farm (Part B)
Nov 9, 2009 8:37 AM
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I should mention that one of the "meeting engagement" aspects of April 19th 1863 at Chickamauga was that there were few entrenchments used. When there were entrenchments, like those formed by Wilder's brigade to teh west of Viniard Farm (actually a log barricade), it was virtually invinciable if properly manned. In the forests to the east of the LaFayette Road, however, there was plenty of "concealment" due to the thick underbrush, but little "cover", in the sense that both sides were still standing through most of the engagements in order to load and fire. Those that could tried to take advantage of the available trees, but there simply weren't enough trees with thick enough trunks to provide suitable cover for everyone that needed it.
So along with increased firepower you have the rise in the use of entrenchments to compensate, a combination which gave the defense an incredible advantage during WWI.
When we get to Sept. 20th, you will also see the advent of another trend - the use of an assault in depth to "punch through & exploit" a line, rather than a broad "general assault" which had been the trend up to this point in the war. Grant's forces would experiment with this the next year at Spotsylvania.
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