Dear History members: In February, 2010, History boards will begin the process of upgrading our community message board software. We are moving to a new community software, KickApps, that will provide greater functionality and ease of use. This transition will take place during the last part of February; the last day that the current boards will be available to you will be Feb. 28, 2010. We realize that many of you have posted great content over the years and might want to save your posts. Please take this time to go back through the boards and save what you want to keep on your own computer. These boards will no longer be accessible after February 28, 2010. If you would like to ask a question about the new boards, click here: http://boards.history.com/forum/Message-Boards-User/108 There will be more details to come as we roll out the new community software. Thank you for your continued patronage. We'll see you on the new, improved boards! Rebecca Cooper AETN Community Manager
|
Posts:
4,612
From:
Southern California Foothills
Registered:
9/10/99
|
|
(1 of 33)
Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 1, 2006 10:24 AM
|
Walter Wever was a German airpower enthusiast (SOMEWHAT akin to America's DeSeversky) with considerable influence in the early thirties as Germany sought to untie the shackles of Versailles and develop an air force. Wever died in 1936, and his vision of long-range strategic air forces with large, four-engined bombers pretty much died with him.
PaulS said:
"Regarding Wever, his lose might have been the proverbial death knell of the Luftwaffe. He was the one great and highly respected leader and tactician/strategist that could have made the difference. To me, this is obvious. Had Wever lived to guide the Luftwaffe into the strategic and more diversified realm that he envisioned, and had he commanded the effort, the British would have lost the BoB. Beyond that, it is anybodies guess. It's incomprehensible to me that such a unique and brilliant personality could imagine that he was in too much of a hurry to make the basic 'walk around', or that someone wasn't there to do it for him."
To me, it is NOT "obvious" how Wever's influence for a more diversified Luftwaffe could have prevailed in the BoB or the war in general. I'd like this post to explore that possibility. Of course we have MASSIVE hindsight to aid us. Go for it!
|
|
|
Posts:
6,787
Registered:
8/12/05
|
|
(2 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 1, 2006 12:50 PM
|
I would think that Wever would have actually hamstrung the Luftwaffe more than helped it. His emphsis on larger four engined bombers of a truly strategic nature would have left the Luftwaffe far smaller and less capable during the early period of the war. The German aircraft industry simply lacked the capacity to build a large four engined bomber fleet.
So, sacrificing much of the more tactical nature of the original Luftwaffe in favor of a more independent but smaller strategic airforce would have likely been a road leading to a wreck much faster for the Germans.
|
|
|
Posts:
1,566
Registered:
3/2/06
|
|
(3 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 1, 2006 1:09 PM
|
Interesting,
What about having a heavy bomber fleet at the beginning at the war with Russia ? That should have meant something, some German raids against the Soviet industry in early 1942 with medium bombers proved successful, but soon they were called off for tactical purposes.
I think at the Moscow-Gorky industrial region, the Ural industrial region, and most of all, the reffineries and oilfields in the Caucasus region.
Also, the need for the Russians to redraw large numbers of fighters and AA guns from the front duties in order to cover a huge territory.
--
Edited by radu at 10/01/2006 1:14 PM
|
|
|
Posts:
2,445
From:
Stockport UK
Registered:
2/11/03
|
|
(4 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 1, 2006 1:53 PM
|
> Interesting,
>
> What about having a heavy bomber fleet at the
> beginning at the war with Russia ? That should have
> meant something, some German raids against the Soviet
> industry in early 1942 with medium bombers proved
> successful, but soon they were called off for
> tactical purposes.
As T.A.Gardner has already pointed out, the German's didn't have the resources to build both a powerful tactical and strategic air force.
Any effort put into building a strategic force would adversely effect the tactical force, and seeing the German's needed to win the war quickly to succeed, any effort put into a strategic force would be a waste.
|
|
|
Posts:
192
Registered:
9/30/99
|
|
(5 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 1, 2006 2:34 PM
|
|
My comment was intended as a response to a comparison of the Strategic Bombing Campaign and the success of the Luftwaffe in the tactical battlefield support role as it relates to the definition of air superiority. My position is that once the Luftwaffe was presented with the BoB, they were simply out of their element. I never suggested that the Luftwaffe could or should try to amass the bomber force that was eventually deployed by the USAAF’s. Wever was well aware of the production limitations involved, one of his favorite comments was “horse-power is victory” or something to that effect. His determination to convert the Luftwaffe from the purely tactical role into a more diversified force, including the ability to project power at greater range, would have produced a far more formidable force when it came time to confront the RAF over Britain. However, perhaps that should have read, “the RAF might have lost the BoB” rather than “the British would have lost the BoB”. First and foremost, I most definitely disagree that Wever's death, ”was a blessing to the Luftwaffe of WW II”.
|
|
|
Posts:
4,612
From:
Southern California Foothills
Registered:
9/10/99
|
|
(6 of 33)
Oct 1, 2006 8:21 PM
|
> I would think that Wever would have actually hamstrung the Luftwaffe more than helped it. <
I would agree, but who really knows? Part of "influence" over military development was political in the Third Reich, and we all know that the Nazi hierarchy favored loyalty over intelligence. Would Wever's views have prevailed had he lived?
One consequence may have been a COMPLETE failure of the strategic air arm if the Bf-110 was thought to "cure" the long-range escort fighter problem and was relied upon to defend the Do-19 (or other) bombers over British airspace. Also, if Germany emphasized strategic bombers, how would Britain have responded? Maybe the Westland Whirlwind twin-engined fighter would have made more of an appearance as a bomber-destroyer (with 4 20mm guns), etc.
|
|
|
Posts:
220
Registered:
7/19/06
|
|
(7 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 2, 2006 6:41 PM
|
The blame for the loss of the Bomber program rests with Hitler as with most of the changes in the late 1930s Wehrmacht.
The strategic program for the Luftwaffe was predicated on Strategic bombing to act as deterrent force to prevent attacks on Germany . This was the centre point of the Risk Luftwaffe of the early 1930s and was to continue right into war. The building programme sought to establish a bomber force of ~ 400 Ju-52 supported by several hundred reconn planes plus hundreds of close liason and tactical recon planes for direct army support.
In 1934/35 a series of wargames showed that the strategic bomber force couldn't defeat ajacent threats sufficently to pervent enemy bomber attacks to seriously damage Germany , so the defensive end was increased with the development of the Me-109 interceptor fighter and the 88mm flak guns. To that end the long range heavy Strategic bomber was crafted to better fill the strategic bomber roll which was expanded to deal with USSR/UK threats.
But Hitler had other ideas. In 1936 he finaly accepted what Schacht had been saying all along , that a 'embargo proof total war economy', would take until mid 1940s to complete. Hitler wanted his racial war ASAP and was unwilling to wait that long. So he gambled on a 'limited war economy ' based on higher risk short term Wehrmacht campaigns that exploited political coersion and strategic shifts in Europe. Because deep down he believed that threats like USSR were racially weak and he believed he could bully the UK into comprimise on Eastern Europe....so there would be no war with the UK and no need for such 'strategic' forces.
Goering used Wevers death to put people in power like Udet, that would reflect the new thinking that emphasised much enlarged army support at the expense of Stategic warfare and the Navy as well.
So yes it would accurate to say that Wevers death signaled the start of the death of the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht and Germany for that matter to.
And yes had Hitler stayed the course and not changed horses midstream, strategic warfare would have been at the heart of an massively overhauled Wehrmacht due to start the war by 1943/44.
People should be aware of the fact that such a later war start would not change much in the enemys armed forces, since most of the best armaments historically were accelerated wartime programs. With out such acceleration they would not have matured or materalised until the mid 1940s.
--
Edited by esl at 10/02/2006 6:54 PM
|
|
|
Posts:
6,624
Registered:
2/27/03
|
|
(8 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 3, 2006 10:52 AM
|
The question is not whether the Germans could have used a strategic bomber force if it just fell from the sky - maybe that's a poor choice of words  - but whether it was the best use of their resources. Would the Wehrmacht be better off with strategic bombers but less tactical air, panzers, etc.? Note that we are hypothesizing large numbers of bombers, not just a small force for special missions, maritime reconnaisance, etc. It may be mentioned that Germany could have mobilized more of its industry for war production earlier, but this does not change the basic question of whether that additional capacity would be best utilized for bombers or for something like providing more panzer and motorized units with first-rate vehicles and equipment.
Their first discovery once the war started would be the same one made by the RAF and USAAF - the effective range of four-engine bombers in daylight was the same as that of twin-engine - the combat radius of their escorting single-engine fighters. Neither Wever nor anyone else (except the Japanese, got that correction last time I posted this) envisioned the need for a "Urals fighter". Most air forces considered long-range single-engine fighters an impossibility; the Luftwaffe opted for the twin-engine Bf1110. So the strategic bombing would be restricted to night operations against any opponent with effective air defense.
Wever envisioned a so-called "Urals Bomber". The Urals are about 2000 mile from Berlin, so if this was literally true it would require a quantum leap forward in technology - an aircraft comparable or superior to the B-29 developed and operational in the 1930s. Such aircraft would be able to bomb most targets in the Gemans' theaters of operations from bases in Germany. Again, it would be subject to fighter interception; as previously mentioned, it could not count on exceeding the altitude capabilities of contemporary interceptors. Bombing Russian industries in particular could require round trips of a thousand miles or more over hostile territory, beyond even the farthest front lines on the ground, some portion of which would probably have to be in daylight except during the Russian winter. Even without radar or sophisticated ground control, fighters could inflict unacceptable attrition.
Getting back to the realm of reality, the Luftwaffe might have fielded aircraft comparable to the Ju90, Lancaster, B-17, et. al., again, with reductions in some other technology-intensive forces - tactical air, panzers, U-boats. Let me start with radu's question - what if the Germans had strategic bombers at the outset of Barbarossa? IIRC the Luftwaffe started Barbarossa witha about 600 bombers and 2-300 Stukas. If this tactical air were cut in half, there might be 200 four-engine bombers available - not much compared to what Bomber Command or the 8th Air Force proved necessary for a bombing campaign. The reduction in tactical air would compromise the gaining of air superiority and the ground advance, and this would get worse the more resources were put into the bomber force. Historically the Germans physically overran within a few months most of the industrial areas which could have been reached by bombers. Once the lines on the ground stabilized, bomber bases would have to be established and the force with its ground support brought forward in order to reach new targets. This would have to accomplished and the force supplied over the same transportation system that struggled to support the existing ground and air forces. The question remains whether bringing bombers forward is better than having and supporting additional air-ground forces which could continue the advance - or hold the line and protect the bomber bases against Russian counteroffensives.
The effectiveness of strategic bombing depends on the situation on the ground being static for an extended period of time. In the absence of geographic factors such as bodies of water separating the combatants, this presumes that neither side's ground forces are capable of a sustained offensive.
Against Britain there are a couple of possibilities. German strategic bombers might operate from bases in Germany like Bomber Command in reverse. This would become a sustained battle of resources and attrition between the two nations, unlikely to provide a quick victory or to favor Germany in the long run. Or we can consider the Battle of Britain as it occurred, following the German occupation of France and the Low Countries. This presumes of course that the land campaign of 1940 occurs as it did historically. Strategic bombers would contribute little to that campaign. They were unsuitable for attacks on enemy airfields or troops or most of the air missions that facilitated the rapid advance on the ground. French industries came under German control in less time than it would take to significantly affect them by bombing. Meanwhile, the ground battle may not have been so successful with less tactical air, armor, or motorized forces. It is entirely possible that the allocation of resources to four-engine bombers might cause the Germans never to reach the positions from which they started the BoB.
As Toomtabard occasionally reminds us, German twin-engine bombers could reach most of the British Isles. Four-engine planes might increase the bomb tonnage, but there would be few targets they could hit which could not be hit historically, and they would be subject to the same constraints of fighter escort, interception, and day/night operations. It seems unlikely that Wever's force would revolutionize the outcome.
|
|
|
Posts:
1,566
Registered:
3/2/06
|
|
(9 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 3, 2006 11:13 AM
|
I might be wrong, but the medium horizontal bombers, like He 111, Dornier, B25, B26, Stirling, DB 3, were not very useful in the war. ?
Waste of resources, you have a dive bomber (JU 87) or assault plane (IL 2), or fighter-bomber, for tactical purposes, and for strategic needs, heavy bombers.
Why send a medium bomber deep in the enemy territory, when you can use a heavy one - (more payload, more range, less vulnerable)?
How can you use a medium (horizontal) bomber in tactical fights? You can, but not much effect if it flies high, very vulnerable if it flies low.
What about a blow on the Russian oil refineries in the summer of 1941 ? Not much bombers needed, the Russian were not prepared, lacked AA guns, radar, the fighters were on the front or around Moscow. If you want to defend that country, you need thousands of fighters inside.
As far as I know, except for the Moscow region, the German planes had no problems in penetrating hundreds of miles inside Russian territory.
--
Edited by radu at 10/03/2006 11:20 AM
|
|
|
Posts:
6,402
From:
Oregon
Registered:
8/7/05
|
|
(10 of 33)
Medium bombers in the USSR
Oct 3, 2006 11:41 AM
|
radu,
A real problem faced by the Luftwaffe in the USSR was the relative lack of permanent all weather airfields. In this case medium bombers were valuable, as they were able to operate better on the makeshift runways the Luftwaffe was forced to use. In the final soviet assault on Berlin the Germans were able to establish some air superiority because they controlled the tarmac, while the soviet airfields simply sank into the mud.
B&B
|
|
|
Posts:
7,008
From:
Billings MT.
Registered:
2/11/03
|
|
(11 of 33)
I simply know that "robert"...
Oct 3, 2006 1:50 PM
|
will jump all over me for this opinion, but the medium bombers of the Luftwaffe were just barely equal to their contemporary allied counterparts, and rarely superior. They were "cheaper" to Nazi Germany, and more needed when they were designed and constructed, but also not able to do the job needed when called upon later.
Here are some data sheets I have put together for the "fun of it" concerning the most "common" of the mediums of WW2, in service at the time.
Specifications (He 111H):
Performance:
Maximum Speed at Sea Level: 227 mph
Ceiling: 21,980 ft.
Range: 1,212 miles
Armament:
One 20-mm MG forward firing cannon;
One 13-mm (0.51-inch) MG 131 machine gun;
Three 7.92-mm (0.31-inch) MG 81Z machine guns;
Internal bomb-load of 2,205 pounds.
Number Built: 7,300
JU-88 Performance
Maximum speed: 510 km/h at 4,750 m (317 mph at 15,600 ft)
Range: 2,108 km (1,310 miles)
Service ceiling: 9,080 m (29,800 ft)
Armament
7x 7.92 mm machine guns
2,500 kg (5511 lb) of bombs
Dornier Do-17 Performance
Maximum speed: 265 mph (427 km/h)
Range: 721 miles (1,160 km) combat (half load)
Service ceiling: 27,000 ft (8,200 m)
Armament
up to six 7.92 mm MG 15 (sometimes lower nose gun replaced with 20 mm MG FF cannon)
up to 2,200 lb (1,000 kg) of bombs
Vickers "Wellington" Performance
Max speed, 261 mph (420 km/h) at 12,500ft (3,810 m)
cruising speed, 211 mph (340 km/h)
Service ceiling, 22,750 ft (6,934 m).
Range with max bombs, 1,200 mis (1,931 km).
4,000 lbs of bombs
Number built: 11,461
DH 98 "Mosquito":
Performance:
Maximum Speed: 362 mph (Later photo-recon versions could exceed 425 mph)
Ceiling: 33,000 ft.
Range: 1,650 miles with full bomb load
Armament:
Four 20-mm cannon in nose
Four 7.7-mm (0.303-inch) machine guns in nose
Internal bomb-load of 2,000 pounds of bombs, or 1,000 pounds of bombs and eight rockets
Number Built: 7,781
Specifications (B-25) "Mitchell":
Performance:
Maximum Speed at 13,000 ft: 272mph
Ceiling: 24,200 ft.
Range: 1,350 miles
Armament:
12 12.7-mm (0.5-inch) machine guns
4,000 internal bomb-load of pounds
Number Built: 9,889
Specifications (B-26) "Marauder":
Performance:
Maximum Speed at 10,000 ft: 283mph
Ceiling: 19,800 ft.
Range: 1,100 miles
Armament:
11 12.7-mm (0.5-inch) machine guns
Up to 4,000 internal bomb-load of pounds
Number Built: 5,157
Does sort of look like the allied mediums were, if not superior to their Luftwaffe contemporaries, they were their equals in all areas. Speed, range, and bomb loads.
Just the way I compare the data of course, but it sure is compelling.
--
Happy Trails,
Clint
--
Edited by brndirt1 at 10/03/2006 1:53 PM
|
|
|
Posts:
6,624
Registered:
2/27/03
|
|
(12 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 3, 2006 1:58 PM
|
radu, I think you have good point, something I have thought about also. Although I have not done a detailed cost/bombload analysis, I think the heavy bomber is more effective in the conventional horizontal bombing role. In addition to the factors you note, a force of heavies would require fewer skilled aircrew - pilot, navigator, bombardier, flight engineer, radio operator - than a force of mediums carrying the same bomb tonnage. Mediums had most of the same skilled positions as heavies; additional crewmen in the heavies were primarily gunners (I personally dislike the idea of carrying extra men just to man guns, except crucial positions like a tail turret). I would submit that most missions which could be accomplished by two or more mediums could be performed more economically by one or more heavies.
I see two primary rationales for light or medium bombers - sometimes it is a little hard to fix a dividing line:
Specific missions which they can perform better - low-level attack, anti-shipping, close support of troops. Although four-engine planes sometimes conducted such missions, the vast majority in all air forces were done by twin-engine types.
As bogey touched on, operating from fields or in conditions where larger aircraft cannot. Planes like the B-25 (my choice for best medium of the war) could operate on rough fields in forward areas and in climates from desert to jungle to Arctic.
Getting back to the Wever discussion, both of these conditions pertained to the Luftwaffe at many points in WWII. A basically tactical force can carry out strategic operations to some extent, whereas a strategic force may be a marginal investment in what is primarily a ground war. A mainly tactical air force could still and IMO should include a small force of effective four-engine aircraft for long-range precision attacks, delivery of special weapons, maritime patrol, etc.
Strategic bombing is largely a matter of attrition over time - damage vs. ability to repair vs. bomber/aircrew losses and replacements. It does not always take a Schweinfurt or Nuremburg - even a small % of losses per mission make it hard to sustain a bomber campaign. Getting away with a small number of long-range penetration missions does not mean that one can conduct major raids day after day, month after month. Also, an ongoing bomber campaign would cause more fighters to be deployed on defense, not to mention that in the example of Russia the bombers would be flying through the front-line combat zone twice each mission. I would not be surprised if a lot of their losses came on the way back home, once whatever element of surprise they had was lost.
One final point which I have made before, strategic warfare does not necessarily mean strategic bombing. I think ground/tactical air forces advancing deep into enemy territory and physically occupying cities, industrial areas, or other resources are conducting strategic warfare just as much as planes bombing those same resources.
|
|
|
Posts:
220
Registered:
7/19/06
|
|
(13 of 33)
Re: Wever's Influence--a Different Luftwaffe?
Oct 3, 2006 2:42 PM
|
Quick note. The Strategic bomber force would be at the expense of Hitlers concept of quality over Quantity, not any armament production. It would have forced the Wehrmacht to take serously Major General Liese [sp] report to the Wehrmacht chiefs on the need for mass producable weapons in 1934.
Probably would have doubled the Aircraft, tank & munitions out put.
--
Edited by esl at 10/03/2006 6:10 PM
|
|
|
Posts:
2,716
From:
Washington state
Registered:
9/10/99
|
|
(14 of 33)
Re: I simply know that "robert"...
Oct 3, 2006 5:26 PM
|
I won't jump all over you at all. I'm a nice person, really...
I'd agree fully that the He 111, Do 17, and the Ju 88 as a set were not up to the standard of Allied bombers if you look at the entire period of the war (although the Ju 88 in particular was an excellent aircraft), but it's hard to judge those aircraft against the Mosquito, B-25, or B-26 because they are of different generations. If you look at what the Allies had in September 1939, the only mediums they had that were comparable with the Ju 88 or He 111 were the Wellington (which was considered a borderline heavy) or the Polish PZL P.37B (a really good aircraft that was never given a chance to succeed), and the French LeO 451, which was just entering service. In comparison to the Handley-Page Hampden or Douglas B-23, the Ju 88A looks very good indeed.
What hurt the Germans was the inability to introduce new aircraft in this class in coming years - they just stretched the designs to their limit, to produce the Ju 188 and Do 217. It's those aircraft that should be compared to the B-25, B-26, and Mosquito, and they come up short.
|
|
|
Posts:
4,612
From:
Southern California Foothills
Registered:
9/10/99
|
|
(15 of 33)
Oct 3, 2006 9:29 PM
|
The content of your posts here have pre-empted almost everything that I was going to say.
I would think that a SMALL force (maybe a single Geschwader or two) of heavy bombers could be helpful on specialized, short-range missions that could be escorted. I still feel that a long-range "strategic" bomber force would have depended on their Bf-110 escorts, and would have gotten trounced similarly to their BoB performance.
Maritime co-operation was neglected by the Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine (the stop-gap Fw-200 had great success, though short-lived) until deep in the war, so perhaps Wever's greatest contribution could have been in this field. Big "IF", though, considering the general lack of co-operation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine over who would fly German military aircraft over the water. *MAYBE* Wever could have had some "pull" and ameliorated that guarded hostility.
I read an interesting article which, in part, postulated that if a German strategic air force had ruined the same amount of Soviet industry that was actually taken by ground forces, they would have considered themselves a fantastic success, yet that destruction of industry was not decisive, and it didn't prevent a Soviet victory.
So what good would such a strategic air force have done for Germany that their tactically supported ground forces could not do?
--
Edited by CTBurke at 10/04/2006 9:40 AM
|
|
|
|
|
